If the power of the United States is declining precipitately forasmuch as what does that penny-pinching for the present system of global governance?
Ironically, though the systems of global governance are increasingly below threat, there has never been a greater need for them, with dire threats to the world economy, roughness, widespread instability in the Middle East, the threat of the use of nuclear weapons in the hands of Iran and North Korea and broad - based concerns about global climate change.
How would the world look below the leadership significance of the emerging powers selfsame as India, Russia and China?
All have a strikingly diverse sight of the world from Washington and other leading Western countries, while the second two nations harbour deep resentments about the way the world is currently canter to a Western agenda. They would take incomparable approaches according to their own interests and historical experiences. Charles Grant, director of the Centre of European Amend, notes that the current international trade and security architecture does not offer much goal for the future of a world in turmoil on many fronts.
The climate change talks in Durban achieved very little, the Doha round of the World Trade Organization is, to all intents and purposes, dead while an unreformed United Nations Security Council offers no representation for the emerging nations and the recent tryst of the G20 was little more than a speech shop.
Each of the more energetic emerging nations take their own design of these international nationality and, for the most part, it is not a irrefutable one, for opening the way for a new era of ' might is right ' international geo - politics, in the outline of Grant, who was speech to a Daiwa Institute seminar.
' I ' m beauteous pessimistic about global governance, ' he says. ' I like bulk multilateral institutions with rules that mortals respect but the possibility world is based on power politics and unyielding countries get their way by bullying little countries with allegiances with other lusty countries so you get to a locale like Europe in 1914 with two rival camps. '
He gives three reasons for the developing global situation:
1. America is getting weaker in relative terms; becoming more unilateralist and less respectful of the United Nations and its organizations, except when it comes to world trade.
2. Europe is weak diplomatically, politically and economically.
3. The emerging powers are quite cynical about global governance and use international institutions when it suits their purposes but they don ' t believe in multilateralism in the way that the Europeans do.
While all the BRICS nations have quite a lot in common, Russia and China have more in common with each other than the others because they are not democratic.
The two nations appear to have five key facets in common: they both take a realistic approach to international governance and see it basically as a Western concept ' run by the West for the benefit of the West and that the West uses global institutions to pursue its interests in the name of the - international community - which they think is a load of rubbish, a series of institutions which the West either controls or dominates. '
Both Russia and China prefer Concert Diplomacy of the kind pursued by the Concert of Europe from the end of the Napoleonic Wars up to the beginning of World War I - the big diplomatic stage such as the Congress of Vienna in 1814 and the division of Europe in 1945 at Yalta. Both countries take part in the six - party talks on the nuclear questions in Iran and North Korea in that vein.
Following in that line, both countries like regional diplomacy - witness Russia ' s enthusiasm for the customs union with Kyrgystan and Belarus which Moscow would like Uzbekistan to join, while President Putin has spoken of turning it into a Eurasian Union. Both are elements of the Shanghai Co - operation Organization, originally intended as a kind of counterpart to NATO and the Association of South - East Asian Nations ( ASEAN ) Plus Three and the ASEAN Regional Forum - both see the value of using regional organizations as a means of boosting their standings in the world as a whole.
Such organizations are seen by both as a means of keeping the United States out of Central Asia while Moscow sees the customs union and the Collective Security Treaty Organization ( CSTO ), neither of which features Beijing as a member, as a way of limiting China ' s influence in the region.
In both Russia and China those in power are roughly separated between the liberals, who are more inclined to be positive about global governance and the nationalists / realists who dominate in the national security field. The last major area in which the two nations agree is over non - interference in the affairs of other countries, according to the United Nations Charter - both are passionate believers in the principle of non - interference. Both believe that the West is hypocritical about the concept ' because we invade Iraq or bomb Kosovo when it suits even though the Security Council doesn ' t allow us to do so '.
But, interestingly, both countries have signed up to the Responsibility to Protect principle, so they have accepted the philosophical concept that it is acceptable to intervene in the affairs of another country if it behaves extremely badly. Yet in practice it is something that they like even less than the other members of the BRICS group.
They adhere to the notion of non - interference because of their histories of being invaded by other countries: China over hundreds of years and Russia up until the middle of the 20th century.
Their policy is also ' about stopping the US - they see intervention as what the US does to pursue its own interests - as in Iraq. So it ' s about standing up to the US but it ' s also about protecting their own territories ' because both have bits and pieces attached to them whose citizens do not wish to remain a part of their area of influence, such as Chechnya with Russia and Xinjiang and Tibet with China. They fear Western interference in these areas and, finally, they have an economic interest in maintaining the principle when it comes to some of the nastiest regimes in the world where both countries have substantial trade and interests, such as in Zimbabwe, Sudan, Venezuela or North Korea.
Among the major differences between Russia and China are their approaches to trade and security agreements. Moscow likes arms control treaties because it has a lot of nuclear and other weapons and so, in discussions on arms control, it has to be taken seriously. While it is a declining power in relative terms it sees arms control as a means of protecting its own status and standing in the world - in its eyes - as a ' great power '.
But Russia does not feel at home in the world ' s economic governance bodies - it will have taken 18 years to join the WTO if and when it joins later this year - because it is not a comprehensive trading power per se: it exports only natural resources, oil, gas and minerals and some weaponry, all of which do not have a governing international framework. China does not care for any kind of arms control at all, not even at the level of banning landmines, and takes no part in efforts to curtail the spread of nuclear weapons nor the sale of dual - use technology. Indeed, China has exported nuclear reactors to Pakistan - something that Russia considers highly irresponsible.
As the leaders of a rising power, the Chinese hierarchy do not want their freedom of movement constrained by limitations on their armament and military options.
Grant says that both nations take the US much more seriously than they take each other. China is much more wary of upsetting Washington than is Moscow, which is going through a phase of seemingly wanting to spike the West ' s guns at every opportunity, particularly since what it sees as a deception over Libya.
Both countries ' leaderships need to display more democratic legitimacy and to re - balance their economies - Russia through the development of manufacturing industries and services and China through encouraging domestic demand to balance its storming export performance.
At the present there is little incentive for either nation to change its economic make - up: Russia ' s energy resources are closely held in a few, mainly former intelligence and leadership, hands. In China that role is played by the big state enterprises which pay little or no tax and retain their profits.
Moscow needs to implement the rule of law and build up foreign investment as a result. If it fails to do that it will grow much more slowly, then that will lead to political instability, social unrest, rising nationalism and increasing paranoia towards the West. Conversely, if rebalancing does take place Moscow ' s leaders will be more confident and more willing to engage with global institutions.
Likewise, if China fails to re - balance there will be political instability and slower growth, which will not be good for the global economy or for global institutions. In both cases vested interests are preventing the two nations ' economies from moving forward.
Either way, in the view of Grant, the emerging powers are going to decide what sort of international system emerges. ' Europe ' s going to be weak for a long time, so Europe ' s not going to shape it while America will be a bit weaker and too introspective - the kind of order we have will be decided by Russia, China and the emerging powers. '
